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The Habermas Rawls Dispute Redivivus


1.	This article is an attempt to refocus and revive interest in the dispute between John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, two of the most important and arguably the two most important contemporary Western political philosophers.​[1]​  When one considers how many works have been committed to print about each of them, it is surprising that more attention has not been paid to the dispute between them.  This may be because the debate has been plagued by misunderstandings on either side, and because commentators have tended to canvass relatively unimportant side issues while the real issue between them has been missed.  I argue that the debate is best understood as one between two accounts of the justification of political norms, and two conceptions of democratic legitimacy, which is what makes the Habermas-Rawls dispute germane to the theme of this volume. Failure to grasp this has led to the dispute’s having been peremptorily dismissed as uninteresting and unworthy of comment. 

2. 	What I shall call the Habermas-Rawls dispute proper is the exchange that actually took place between them in the Journal of Philosophy in 1995 and Habermas’s subsequent reflections upon it.​[2]​ I shall be mainly concerned with this dispute. Prima facie this dispute, which took place three years after the publication of Faktizität und Geltung and two years after Political Liberalism is a dispute within political theory, for the former is a theory of democratic legitimacy and the rule of law and the latter a defence of justice as a political conception.​[3]​ For various reasons, this is not how the dispute is usually interpreted. It is usually, and in my view wrongly, understood either as a debate between two moral theories, and two conceptions of the moral point of view, or as a debate between two competing conceptions of justice.
Prior to the Habermas-Rawls dispute proper there was a debate prompted some critical remarks by Habermas in Morality and Communicative Action on Rawls’s Theory of Justice,  and set in train by various commentators on discourse ethics.  (Habermas 1993: 43, 66, 79) Let's call this early debate.​[4]​ The early debate took shape through a critical comparison of discourse ethics and A Theory of Justice. In my view even the early debate is also best not understood as one between two competing moral theories or conceptions of the moral point of view. Let me explain why. 
In A Theory of Justice Rawls uses the concept of justice in a narrow, specifically distributive sense, the sense encapsulated in his two principles of justice.​[5]​ Several interpretations of Rawls’s notion of justice are possible. Still, whether one thinks of justice as a method for fairly settling claims by citizens against the basic structure of society, as a principle for regulating institutions only (what Rawls calls ‘the basic structure’) or as a more substantial social ideal that is to regulate certain areas of individual conduct, there is an important sense in which ‘justice as fairness’ is not a moral theory, for it is not a general theory of right conduct.​[6]​ At most, it is only part of a such a general moral theory, namely the part that has to do with social and political justice.​[7]​ This becomes more explicit in Political Liberalism where Rawls ceases presenting justice as fairness as a comprehensive doctrine, and presents it instead as a way of specifying the content of a political conception of justice, understood as a module that can fit into any reasonable comprehensive doctrine. (Rawls, 2005: 144-5)​[8]​ 
Habermas’s discourse ethics, by contrast, is a moral theory in the broader sense of a general theory of right conduct. This is true despite the fact that discourse ethics, because of Habermas’s approach to morality, purports to say nothing about the outcomes of moral discourses and does not even try to answer substantive normative questions of what one ought to do and why (Habermas 1993: 24). Still, discourse ethics is and is presented as a moral theory, for its object is a deontological and universal morality. Accordingly the moral principle (U) regulates actions; and moral rightness, the central concept of discourse ethics and the central phenomenon to be studied, covers the whole range of interpersonal conflicts of action that can be resolved by appeal to valid moral norms.​[9]​ This, then, is a crucial difference between Habermas and Rawls that often goes unnoticed. Habermas understands discourse ethics as a general moral theory – in the sense of a theory of right conduct – whereas Rawls denies that his theory of justice is a moral theory in that same sense. However interpreted, Rawls’s theory of justice has a more restricted focus, since it is tailored in the first instance to the basic structure of society (Rawls, 1973: 7-10).​[10]​  
Secondly, and more controversially, I maintain that the early debate is best not understood as a debate between two competing theories of justice. It is easy to fall into the trap of thinking that Habermas and Rawls are offering competing and discrepant conceptions of justice, because both theorists present ‘justice’ as the central concept of their respective theories and as the object of their respective enquiries. This trips up, among others, Christopher McMahon, who, after initially suggesting that Habermas and Rawls are advancing competing moral theories (which we have just seen to be wrong) abruptly changes tack, and  contrasts Rawls’s project of providing a political conception of justice for modern democratic societies with Habermas’s “characterisation of the moral point of view suitable for all moral reasoning.” (McMahon, 2002: 112.) On this point McMahon is in my view correct.  However, instead of going on to question the comparability of the two theories, he concludes: 
Still, for Habermas, moral principles are principles of justice. So we can interpret Habermas and Rawls as advancing different proposals concerning how to understand the requirements of justice in political contexts.​[11]​
Now it follows from what we have said that we cannot and should not interpret Habermas and Rawls in this way, for ‘justice’ in Habermas’s eyes is a general moral term and the central normative term of a general moral theory, whereas for Rawls it is not.​[12]​ Since Habermas and Rawls mean very different things by ‘justice’, McMahon is quite wrong to infer from the fact that they both use the same term that they must be offering competing theories of the same thing.
	This supports my contention that the early debate is best interpreted neither as a debate between two competing moral theories, nor as a debate between two competing conceptions of justice. The first interpretation makes the mistake of assuming Rawls's theory of justice to be a general moral theory like discourse ethics; and the second makes the mistake of assuming Habermas's discourse ethics to be a theory of social justice like A Theory of Justice.  Nonetheless, much of the literature up to the mid-1990’s inclines to one or other of these interpretations. Commentators either interpret Rawl’s theory of justice as a general moral theory, an elaboration and defence of the moral point of view; or they interpret Habermas’s discourse ethics as a political theory in disguise, and theory of democratic legitimation, rather than as a moral theory. ​[13]​ 
Now anyone who holds either of these views will tend to think that Rawls’s theory of justice and Habermas's discourse ethics are like for like and competing theories.​[14]​ And since principle (U) is the central notion of Habermas’s discourse ethics, while Rawls’s attempt to derive the principles of justice from the original position is the central manoeuvre of A Theory of Justice, anyone who thinks that Habermas and Rawls have like for like theories will probably also hold that principle (U) and the original position form the salient points of comparison between them. Indeed that principle (U) and the original position form the salient points of comparison of their respective theories and that such a comparison is a good basis for an informed grasp of the debate between them has become the standard view. ​[15]​  
Habermas and Rawls, it has to be said, are in part responsible for firmly cementing the standard view in the literature. Habermas devotes part I of his discussion of Rawls to a critique of the original position in A Theory of Justice, where he explicitly criticises the way Rawls “operationalized the moral point of view” in the original position, and critically contrasts this with his own conception of universalisation as “ideal role taking” (Habermas, 1995: 117).​[16]​  Rawls, for his part, agrees that a main point of dispute is contained in the difference between their respective “analytic devices of representation – the ideal discourse situation and the original position”. (Rawls, 2005: 381) ​[17]​ This is a little surprising given that the 1995 dispute is ostensibly about their respective political and democratic theories: Habermas’s contribution is entitled, “Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawl’s Political Liberalism”, but only goes to show the degree to which each theorist is influenced by what Gadamer would call the “effective history” of the other’s work.​[18]​ Habermas is drawn, presumably by the influence of Lawrence Kohlberg, to the moral reading of Rawls’s theory of justice, while Rawls succumbs to the political reading of discourse ethics. 
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This shows that salient points of comparison are on the one hand, Habermas’s idea of discourse captured in principle (D) and the democratic principle, and on the other Rawls’s ideas of public reason and of an overlapping consensus.​[21]​ Habermas elaborates the idea that valid and legitimate political and legal norms are grounded in the democratic procedure and the principle of democracy, while Rawls develops a ‘political’ conception of justice based on the  idea of public reason. So, if we want to discover what the real issue between Habermas and Rawls is, we must look at their respective conceptions of political legitimacy and political justification.​[22]​ By the ‘real issues’ here I don’t just mean differences between the two theories, which are legion, but significant points of dispute between them. Points of dispute obtain where there is an idea or set of ideas that the one affirms and the other denies.​[23]​ Such disputes are also significant where they concern the central organising ideas of their respective political theories.  
	Now one glance at the index of Between Facts and Norms suffices to show that legitimacy is a central and organising idea of Habermas’s political and legal theory. A brief glance at the index of Political Liberalism, however, reveals that Rawls uses the term comparatively seldom.​[24]​ However, the idea of public reason and of public justification are keystones of the latter’s mature political theory, and as Fred D’Agostino notes the liberal notion of legitimacy follows from these ideas. 
The idea of public justification is the key idea in contemporary liberal-democratic political theory. The idea is, roughly, that no regime is legitimate unless it is reasonable from every individual's point of view.” (D’Agostino 1996: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justification-public/ (​http:​/​​/​plato.stanford.edu​/​entries​/​justification-public​/​​))
So, in order to discover what the issue between Habermas and Rawls is (or whether there is not one) we have to compare idea of legitimacy with the notion of public justification in Habermas and in Rawls, and to show how in their respective theories each the two ideas connect.

3.	In modern politics and political theory ‘legitimate’ is a predicate that applies in the first instance to states and governments and to political orders, in particular to their right to coerce and to command; it applies derivatively to laws and policies and their implementation. One reason why the concept of legitimacy is hard to define is that it is an historical residue of different notions. As Thomas Nagel has remarked, “The task of discovering the conditions of legitimacy is traditionally conceived as that of finding a way to justify a political system to everyone who is required to live under it.” (Nagel, 1996: 33) Nagel’s statement is true of the tradition of modern political theory stemming from Rousseau and Kant, though not generally true.​[25]​ In this republican tradition political legitimacy is usually taken to be conferred by public justification: to justify a law is to justify it to everyone who must live under it; and a law thus justified is legitimate  in the sense that everyone who must live under it has a good reason for complying with it.​[26]​ In Rousseau legitimacy flows from the general will understood as the collective act of assent of free and equal citizens uniting in the assembly. Kant’s universal principle of right legitimates any or act or law that enables the external freedom of each individual to coexist with that of everyone else according to a universal law. That this is a notion of legitimacy is shown by the fact that it is supposed to entail the authority to use coercion. (Kant, 1991: 133) Kant also claims that the idea of the social contract, understood as a test of hypothetical possible consent of a people, can serve as “a test of the rightfulness of every public law” where rightfulness is equivalent with legitimacy (Kant, 1991: 79).​[27]​
	In other traditions political justification means much less than this. One can justify a state (or law) by showing that it is better that it exists than not, or that it is better than any alternative arrangement, but that is not sufficient for legitimacy. Simmons argues that the liberal concept of legitimacy stemming from Locke is grounded in acts of consent bestowed on governments by individuals in return for its guaranteeing and protecting their private interests (Simmons, 1999; Habermas, 1996: 268-9). What is common to both liberal and republican conceptions is that legitimacy plays a practical role in the evaluation and criticism of states (and governments or laws), and also in answering the normative question of political obligation: Why should I obey the law?  

4.	Habermas’s ‘rational reconstruction’ of legitimacy combines elements from normative political theory and empirical sociology, that is, it examines the phenomenon of legitimacy both from the practical perspective of participants – democratic citizens – and from the empirical perspective of the social theorist. Qua normative theory, Habermas’s discourse theory consists in a novel reconfiguration of the two notions of legitimacy adumbrated above. Qua social theory Habermas advances a functional explication of legitimacy that draws on the work of Max Weber. According to Weber, the function of legitimacy is to make general compliance with laws more likely and thereby to establish social order and stability. Hence the superiority of legitimate as opposed to illegitimate regimes.
An order which is adhered to from motives of pure expediency is generally much less stable than one upheld on a purely customary basis through the fact that the corresponding behaviour has become habitual. The latter is much the most common type of subjective attitude. But even this type of order is in turn much less stable than an order which enjoys the prestige of being considered binding, or, as it may be expressed, the prestige of “legitimacy”. (Weber, 1947: 31; Habermas 1996: 68 ) 
Legitimacy elicits compliance in two ways: it helps the state to exercise its monopoly on violence, and also makes a high-degree of actual coercion unnecessary by eliciting spontaneous voluntary conformity to law. As such it lies at the root of social order in modern societies. ​[28]​ I cannot go into the details of Habermas’s sociology of law here. Let us focus on the normative dimension (Habermas 1996: 42-81, 111-118). 
Habermas’s approach assumes that the propriety of an existing procedure is governed by internal rules or ideals, which when reconstructed can be used as a critical standard for the appraisal of it. He acknowledges that the notion of legitimacy is an historical amalgam of both liberal and Republican notions, each of which, he argues, is rooted in a different conception of autonomy: private and public autonomy respectively. Hence, unlike Simmons for example, Habermas does not attempt to choose between them, but to bring both sources of legitimacy into a perspicuous relation. (C.f. Simmons, 1999) In Habermas’s view, the democratic procedure confers legitimacy by securing “the private and public autonomy and legal subjects.” (Habermas, 1996: 450, 94-98) 
	Public autonomy is contained in the idea of popular sovereignty, namely that “the citizens can understand themselves as the authors of law to which they are subject as addressees.” (Habermas, 1996: 449) ​[29]​ However, in its republican form this idea usually goes together with the assumption that society comprises a single people (with a high degree of cultural homogeneity) who gather together regularly in an assembly.​[30]​ So, Habermas argues, given the size, and the internal differentiation and complexity, not to mention the cultural pluralism of modern society, this idea has to be modified.  Nowadays, democratic decision-making bodies (Habermas also calls these ‘strong publics’) form “the core structure in a separate, constitutionally organised political system.” The republic is not a model for society at large nor even “for all government institutions” and society cannot be conceived as a parliament or assembly write large, because ”the democratic procedure must be embedded in a context it cannot itself regulate.” (Habermas, 1996: 305) Under such conditions public autonomy and popular sovereignty can survive only if the right relation obtains between the decision-making bodies and the forms of association in which they are embedded, i.e., between ‘strong publics’ and what Habermas calls ‘weak publics’ or ‘civil society’. ‘Weak publics’ are informal public spheres, that is, forms of deliberative association not geared to decision-making, e.g. voluntary organisations, grassroots organisations, the mass-media, in which public opinion and perceptions of the common good (or as he puts it “communicative freedom”) is generated. In these spheres communication and discourse can circulate freely, untouched by governments and administration, and regulated only by the rules of the practice. When the democratic process functions well, decision-making bodies are open to input from informal public spheres, through a system of ‘channels’ and ‘sluices’. In this way, the democratic procedure siphons up the public reasons that arise from the forms of communication discourse circulating in the weak publics, and these in turn ground the (presumed) legitimacy of its outputs, by making these more likely to meet with widespread agreement. (Habermas, 1996: 448).
	According to Habermas private autonomy is contained in the liberal idea of human rights, and plays an equally important role in the democratic procedure. 
These rights legally enshrine the status of subjects as free and equal citizens, who can come together as “in a voluntary association of consociates under law” (Habermas, 1996: 126). For example, political rights protect and legally guarantee “the conditions under which citizens can judge that the law they make is legitimate” (Habermas, 1996: 127). In other words, Habermas argues, individual human – political, civil and social – rights, foster the communicative freedom on which the democratic procedure depends, and in this way “guarantee that all formally and procedurally correct outcomes enjoy a presumption of legitimacy.” (Habermas, 1996: 127)

5.	Habermas’s rational reconstruction of the political institutions, practices and culture of a democratic society aims to fit both the self-understanding of participants in the practice or procedure (citizens of modern democratic societies) and the sociologist’s empirical observations and functional explanations of the practice. Between Facts and Norms presupposes that a rational reconstruction of practical discourse has already yielded principle (D) which is the internal rule of practical argumentation (Habermas 1992a: 66). Principle (D) states that “only those norms are valid that could meet with the assent of all those potentially affected, insofar as they participate in rational discourse.” (Habermas, 1996: 107, 127, 458/Habermas: 1992b: 138, 161) Note that (D) says that amenability to consensus in (an ideally prosecuted) discourse is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of the validity of any norm.​[31]​ What Habermas calls the ‘democratic principle’ is supposed to arise from the interpenetration of principle (D) and the legal form,  or the legal institutionalisation of forms of practical discourse. The democratic principle states that:
Only those legal statutes [juridischen Gesetze = laws GF] may claim legitimacy [legitime Geltung] that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted. (Habermas, 1996: 110; 1992b: 141) 
	Before examining the democratic principle, let us briefly address the question of what Habermas means by ‘the legal form’. This will tell us what he thinks characterises political norms as opposed to moral norms and action-norms in general.​[32]​ We can summarise Habermas’s very complex theory with the following schema. If a political norm is valid, then:
(I)	a.	Its violation is punishable by some legitimate sanction
b.	There exists generally effective and legitimate mechanism for applying it – (punishable here implies the existence of the police and the judiciary as organs of the state).
c.	The members of the legal community generally know that a. and b. obtain.
d. 	This is sufficient to ensure average compliance.
In addition to the conditions set out in (I), if a political norm is valid, then:
(II)	a.	It has some intrinsic rationale or point independent of (I).
b. 	Its rationale connects with the common good of the legal community and its members.
c.	Its rationale is open to view and generally understood. 
d.	In virtue of a, b, and c the law is such that members of the legal community have good reason to obey it.
This schema helps us to distinguish between the validity (I + II), the legitimacy (II) and what Habermas calls the facticity or positivity of a political norm (I). Habermas claims that both the facticity (I) and legitimacy (II) are jointly sufficient conditions of the validity of a political norm, and that each is individually necessary. This means that the validity of a political norm (or law) is a much richer and more complex notion than that of the validity of practical norms in general, which notion of validity is that contained in (D) and is equivalent with acceptability in an ideally prosecuted discourse. Note also that (II) is independent of (I), insofar as (II) contains no reference to (I), but the reverse is not the case since (I) explicitly refers to (II), which signals the primacy of legitimacy over facticity. The primacy of legitimacy is not just a conceptual point, it tallies with the sociological fact that in modern, post-conventional, democratic societies, social order and the burden of social integration rest primarily (but not only) on the legitimacy of its laws and institutions.​[33]​ 
	Now we can return to the democratic principle. Habermas maintains that in modern Western societies the only source of the legitimacy of law is “the democratic procedure for the production of law” and the democratic principle is supposed to capture that procedure (Habermas, 1996: 448). Three points of elucidation are required. First, the democratic procedure captured by the democratic principle does not refer only to the internal rules of decision-making bodies (such as those concerning majority decisions) it includes the responsiveness of such bodies to the reasons that flow into them from the informal public spheres in which they are embedded. Habermas puts the point as follows: it is in virtue of its discursive character that the democratic procedure can confer legitimacy, for this “makes it possible for issues and contributions, information and reasons to float freely…” (Habermas, 1996: 448). When all goes well, this responsiveness goes in two directions; the decisions of decision-making bodies share sensitive to inputs from weak publics, and the outputs (laws and policies) in turn resonate with the reasons in the weak public sphere. (This last point is just another way of stating that enacted laws must have an appreciable rationale if they are to find acceptance in society at large and to elicit compliance from citizens.) To sum up, legitimacy is conferred on political norms by the democratic procedure, but that procedure must be understood very broadly such that all the ingredients of political justification are internal to it. The democratic principle presupposes the possibility of “all the various kind of justification operative in discourses (and procedurally regulated transactions) to which laws owe their legitimacy”. (Habermas, 1992b: 142/1996: 110 translation amended).
	Now, the democratic principle is similar to (D) in structure. It does not state that a law’s resulting from the democratic procedure is sufficient for it to be presumed legitimate, only that it is necessary. The principle tells us, for example, that a law (or political norm) is not legitimate, if the decision that passed it violated the rules of the democratic decision making bodies, or if the legislative process has otherwise not been legally constituted. Moreover, and more importantly, it shows us that a law is not legitimate if it is not justified in the light of the reasons that are supposed to flow into the democratic-decision making body through the above mentioned ‘sluices’ and ‘channels’ from the weak public sphere, where the law itself must eventually find acceptance. 
	To see what is at stake here, we have to know what kinds of reasons Habermas thinks are internal to the democratic procedure, and as such necessary conditions of the legitimacy of a political norm. Neither my schema nor the democratic principle specifies what kinds of reasons are germane to the justification of political norms, and therefore sources of legitimacy. The brief answer to this question is that “such norms [i.e., political norms – GF] can be justified by calling on pragmatic, ethical-political and moral reasons”(Habermas, 1996: 108).​[34]​ Among these moral reasons are pre-eminent and have priority. Moral reasons are reasons given by valid moral norms, which is to say norms which all affected can accept in an ideally prosecuted discourse because they demonstrably contain universalizable interests.​[35]​ Habermas claims that that legitimate laws must “harmonize” or be compatible with valid moral norms (Habermas, 1996: 99, 155). But compatibility can mean quite different things. Laws against murder are compatible with the moral prohibition against killing in that they proscribe the same act. However, compatibility can mean much less than that and Habermas has something weaker in mind, namely that a law is not legitimate if it conflicts with valid moral norm: “a legal order can be legitimate only if it does not contradict basic moral principles.”​[36]​ He does not claim that moral permissibility is sufficient for legitimacy, in fact he tends to deny this.​[37]​ Nowhere does he state what the sufficient conditions of legitimacy are though, one presumes that it may involve some combination of ethical and pragmatic reasons and outcomes of fair bargaining processes as well. Perhaps he thinks this is an empirical rather than a conceptual matter. At one point he states that “reasons for the legitimacy of laws must… harmonize with the ethical principles of a consciously ‘projected’ life-conduct…” (Habermas, 1999: 99/1992b: 128). But clearly the role of ethical reasons is different from that of moral reasons, since ethical-political reasons have to do only with the authentic self-understanding and the conceptions of the good of cultural groups (Habermas 1993: 4-8). Given the fact of pluralism it seems unlikely that in a modern multi-cultural society laws will be able to accord with all the morally permissible ethical conceptions of the good in civil society, and to the extent they can, they will have to accord with several. This does not mean that it cannot be a necessary condition of a law’s legitimacy that it accord with the ethical self-understanding of all citizens. It means that any law that satisfies that condition will have to accord various different conceptions of the good or of an authentic life.

6.	In Political Liberalism Rawls advances the liberal principle of legitimacy on the basis of his idea of public reason and his conception of the political. It is that:
Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason. (Rawls, 2005: 137)
The principle requires that laws be enacted by a constitution the essentials of which accord with “public reason” and are thus acceptable to all free and equal citizens. From it Rawls derives a moral duty of citizenship that he calls the duty of civility: “to explain to one another on those fundamental questions, how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason.” (Rawls 2005, 217) Both the principle of legitimacy and the duty of civility pivot on the concept of public reason. 
	Rawls develops his notion of public reason in the light of what he calls the “fact of reasonable pluralism” about the good, which he claims is the characteristic feature of modern political and social life. For there are many competing and incompatible comprehensive doctrines which are reasonable, i.e., that are capable of supporting viable moralities, just principles and fair terms of co-operation. Therefore, he argues: “Since there is no reasonable religious, philosophical or moral doctrine affirmed by all citizens, the conception of justice affirmed in a well-ordered democratic society must be a conception limited to…the domain of the political” where the political comprises only those ideas, values and reasons that can form part of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines (Rawls, 2005: 38)​[38]​ Under conditions of pluralism, were the justification of the basic structure and constitutional essentials of society based on any comprehensive doctrine, controversy and conflict would ensue and prevent it from providing the basis of stability for the right reasons. Rawls’s notion of the ‘political’, then, has a narrow scope, for he restricts the target of political justification to the basic structure and constitutional essentials or to matters arising in the “public political forum”, and  he restricts the range of available reasons that can be used to debate such matters to only those reasons that can form part of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. (Rawls, 2005: 443)​[39]​

7.	Now we have a better idea of what Habermas and Rawls mean, respectively, by ‘legitimacy’ and how it connects to their respective ideas of public justification’ we can locate the real issues in the Habermas-Rawls Dispute.  Rawls’s first main criticism of Habermas’s theory is that it is itself comprehensive and rests on other comprehensive doctrines (Rawls, 2005: 373). Rawls understands the term ‘comprehensive doctrine’ very broadly. It covers variously religions, world views, moral doctrines (in the sense of general theories of right conduct such as utilitarianism, or Kantianism) meta-ethical theories and philosophical theories. His criticism has at least three prongs. The first is that Habermas’s democratic and legal theory takes a lot of theoretical hostages to fortune, which is undoubtedly true.​[40]​ The second prong is that, according to Rawls, this fact violates the principle of political legitimacy, which requires that “the basic structure and its public policies are to be justifiable to all citizens” only on the basis of “presently accepted beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial.” (Rawls, 2005: 225)  The third prong is that Habermas’s political theory assumes that a specific kind of moral and liberal self-understanding, as described by discourse ethics, is the true one, whereas Rawls’s political conception of justice, proceeds apart from “all kinds of doctrines – religious metaphysical and moral” and so does not take a stand on which is the true morality, and which the correct moral theory (Rawls, 2005: 375).​[41]​
	Habermas replies that Rawls is wrong to think that comprehensive doctrines in the first sense – religions and world views – can be true or false. Behind this complaint lies a more general criticism, namely that Rawls’s notion of a comprehensive doctrine is too wide, for it conflates religions and world views, moral doctrines, moral theories (both normative moral theories and meta-ethical theories) and philosophical theories generally. Rawls simply asserts that in all these cases there is a plurality of reasonable and competing doctrines of which we do not know which one is true. 
	Habermas denies that religions and world views are so much as truth-apt, but he thinks that meta-ethical and philosophical theories by contrast are truth-apt.​[42]​ In other words, when Sultan Saladin poses the famous question to Nathan, in Lessing’s Nathan der Weise - Which is the true religion? – he is not even asking the same question as the philosopher who asks whether, say, expressivism is the correct meta-ethical theory of morality, or whether Platonism or constructivism gives us the correct ontological and semantic theory for mathematics.​[43]​ According to Habermas, religions and world views (unlike theories that make validity claims to truth, or discourses that make validity claims to rightness) are appraised by whether or not they give rise to, and make possible, authentic ways of living, not by whether there is reason to believe them true or false, right or wrong. (Habermas, 1995: 126)​[44]​ Habermas’s criticism is that just as Rawls conflates two very different kinds of comprehensive doctrine, so he mistakes one kind of controversy – rational argument between bodies of theory competing for truth (or rightness) – for another – clashes between religions or world views competing for allegiance from citizens. It is one thing to claim that the justification of political norms may not appeal to religions and world views on pain of giving rise to controversy and conflict that may jeopardise their ability to provide stability for the right reasons. But it is quite another, according to Habermas, to say that, for the same reasons theoretical justifications of the democratic principle and of a theory of democratic politics may not appeal to empirical, philosophical and meta-ethical theories. 

OK. Is this Habermas’s claim?

Is Rawls’s worry that, reasonable people can disagree about what is the correct theory of morality. Is the fact of reasonable pluralism a fact about moral theory? Can we, must we, assume that in this domain, the correct theory may not win out?
In this case, reasonable disagreement is a stage on the way to rational resolution of the dispute. In other words reasonable disagreement is not a fact, but a temporary stopping off point.

What about Religion and World views. In this case it seems plausible to assume that the correct theory, if there is one, may not win out. Here reasonable pluralism is a fact.

The cognitivism or non-cognitivism of world views/religions on the one hand, and philosophical and meta-ethical theories on the other, is not really the issue. The issue is: is it reasonable to assume that the correct theory may not win out. If so will reasonable disagreement have any socially harmful effects.

	There are two sets of issues here that need to be disentangled, questions of political method and methodology, and about the status of their respective theories, and substantive question concerning what considerations are appropriate to political justification. 

a) 	For Rawls, the principle of reciprocity, the restrictions imposed on political justifications by the liberal principle of legitimacy and the concomitant duty of civility, apply self-reflexively to justice as fairness as a political conception. In other words, justice as fairness as a political conception is itself a product of practical political reason and complies with the duty of civility insofar as it too may appeal only to political reasons (Rawls, 2005: 216-220). Justice as fairness is not only a political theory, it is also an exemplar of good political practice; a realization of political virtue on Rawls’s narrow understanding of ‘political’.​[45]​
Habermas views rational reconstruction as different in kind from the practical and political discourses, practices and institutions it reconstructs. The discourse theory of law and democracy is justified insofar as it fits both with the external sociological facts about modern democratic states, and with the internal self-understanding of participants or citizens of Western liberal-democratic societies. In addition, it has to cohere with other philosophical, social scientific and scientific theories. Such justification is theoretical, not practical. Habermas thinks that it is difficult or impossible as a political theorist to exercise the duty of civility, and that it is entirely unnecessary anyway, so long as the political theorist offers good reasons or justifications for her view; moreover to do so would be to smudge the distinction between the observer’s perspective of the expert political theorist, and the participant’s perspective of the democratic citizen.  

b) 	The substantive issues concern what reasons are germane to the justification of political norms and to the procedures that confer legitimacy. And here the lineaments of the dispute are clear. Habermas thinks that moral reasons provided by valid moral norms are prior to, and place constraints on, what citizens can agree upon in political discourse: namely the moral permissibility constraint on what can be a legitimate law. These indeed are reasons that are acceptable to all participants in moral discourse, and so (assuming Habermas’s moral theory is correct) can also be expected to form part of an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines of free and equal citizens.  For Rawls what makes these reasons germane to the justification of political norms is just that they are part of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, whereas for Habermas it is that they are based on norms that everyone could accept in an ideally prosecuted moral discourse, and that legitimate laws are subject to the moral permissibility requirement.  
 	There is a second point of dispute here. Rawls allows that laws can be legitimate (in the sense that they have been duly enacted by citizens according to a constitution the essentials of which all may reasonably be expected to endorse as free and equal- the endorsement condition) and yet not be just, since they do not accord with the principles that would be agreed to by hypothetical agents in the original position. Legitimacy sometimes falls short of justice. (Rawls, 2005: 427.) But that a legitimate law not be just in Habermas’s sense of justice, is ruled out by the moral permissibility requirement on legitimacy. On Habermas’s view if a law is unjust, because it violates a valid moral norm, it is therefore illegitimate.​[46]​
	OK this is not clear.
Perfect R justice can come apart from legitimacy. 
If a law or policy is legitimate, this entails only that it is adequately just for it to satisfy the endorsement condition. It does not entail that it be perfectly just.

 	Finally, Habermas allows that ethical reasons are germane to the justification of political norms, though he concedes in modern pluralist societies ethical reasons are by their very nature reasons that are likely not to be shared by every citizen or consociate under law. Therefore he allows (and Rawls denies) that not every reason that is germane to political justification can be endorsed by everyone.  It is only the case that for Habermas legitimate laws “on pain of cognitive dissonance” must harmonize with the ethical self-understanding of all, or at least most, citizens. So, if a law is legitimate, there must be some reason for each citizen to endorse it from the perspective of their individual or collective conception of the good, though not necessarily the same one. Rawls has a similar idea, which he calls “full justification” namely that each citizen must embed the political conception (or fit it as a module) in their respective reasonable comprehensive doctrine. But he claims that the political conception is first specified independently of any reasonable comprehensive doctrine, on the basis of “only political values” (He calls this “pro-tanto justification”.) In a final step, that he calls “public justification” each citizen acknowledges the fact that every other citizen can embed the political conception in their respective comprehensive doctrine. The crucial difference is that “the contents of these doctrines have no normative role in public justification”. (Rawls, 2005: 386-7). On Rawls’s view, good democratic citizens achieve public justification by filtering out ethical reasons from the political process, whereas on Habermas’s view democratic institutions aims to secure political justification by incorporating as many ethical reasons in the democratic procedure as possible.
	 
Does Habermas and need Habermas deny the fact of reasonable pluralism about morality?
Is the moral permissibility requirement that legitimate laws violate no actually existing valid moral norms. Suppose there are none to violate. Could there be a legitimate law?
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^1	  Thanks are due to Sorin Baiasu, Chris Zurn, Jeff Flynn, James Gledhill, David Peritz, Jim Bohman, Richard Whatmore, Knud Haakonssen and to the various members of the 14th Annual Critical Theory Roundtable in Windsor, especially Jim Bohman and Deborah Cook, the workshop on Kantian Justifications of Political Norms in Manchester, 2006,. 
^2	  Rawls, 1995; Habermas, 1995 & 1999: 75-105.
^3	  Habermas, 1992b. Habermas, 1996. Rawls, 2005) [1993].
^4	  Important initiators of this debate were White, 1988; Baynes, 1992; Benhabib, 1992; and Moon, 1995.
^5	  The two principles of justice are so well known I omit to spell them out. (Rawls, 2005: 6) It is true that Rawls stretches the boundaries of distributive justice by construing rights liberties as distributable goods, for which Habermas criticises A Theory of Justice. (Habermas, 1995: 114). That Rawls thinks his theory of justice has implications wider than those concerning which distributions of goods are just, but is to serve as the ideal of a just society, is evident from the oft neglected part III of A Theory.  
^6	  See Scanlon, 2003 and Cohen, 2000 for two different ways of reading Rawls’s notion of justice.
^7	  Though a general theory of right conduct is a comprehensive doctrine, not all comprehensive doctrines are also general theories of right conduct. See section 7 below.
^8	  There is a qualified sense in which even the later Rawls allows that justice as fairness is a moral conception, and that the ideas and values on which it is based, namely the idea of persons as free and equal, and the idea of society as a fair cooperative venture, are moral values. By calling these political values ‘moral’ Rawls wants to indicate also that they have normative content, and that they are “very great values” that are “not easily overridden”, i.e., that they have a certain centrality and normative priority. (Rawls, 2005: 11, note 11) The crucial point here, is what Rawls does not mean by moral. Rawls denies that the theory of justice is a moral theory in the sense of a comprehensive doctrine, and that it is a general theory of right conduct.
^9	  Principle (U) states that: “a norm is valid if and only if the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be freely accepted jointly by all concerned.”  (Habermas, 1993: 60).
^10	  I am only denying that Rawls’s theory of justice is a moral theory in the same sense that Habermas’s discourse ethics is, i.e., a general theory of right conduct. At most, it can be argued that it is part of such a moral theory, and possibly even a central part. For example von Wright is among those who thinks that the justice principle (his own or something like it) is central to a general theory of right conduct (von Wright, 1963: 208). But even if this is true and Rawls’s principles of justice are taken to apply to the motivations and actions of individuals within social institutions, not solely to the institutions themselves, Rawls’s theory is not a moral theory in the same sense that discourse ethics is, and Rawlsian justice is not equivalent with moral rightness. 
^11	  McMahon, 2002: 112.
^12	  Although of course justice is a moral concept in the attenuated senses identified above. (See above n. 6) Rawlsian ‘justice’ is part of the broader domain of the moral, and it is constructed on the basis of values and ideas that are themselves moral. 
^13	  Lawrence Kohlberg the moral psychologists whose theory of moral development was a great influence on Habermas, is a good example. He explicitly takes justice as fairness to be a general theory of right conduct. (Kohlberg 1981: 197, 134-5), See also Sandel, 1982; Benhabib, 1992; Baynes 1992; and Habermas 1992a)
^14	  This would not be true of somebody who held both, but to my knowledge nobody holds both.
^15	  Moon: 1995; Benhabib: 1992: Baynes 1992; and Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 17-19 and McMahon, 2002: 111. 
^16	  See also Habermas, 1992a: 66.
^17	  In a footnote he expresses some misgivings about this and wonders aloud whether “a more useful comparison might be between the ideal discourse situation and the position of citizens in civil society, you and me.” This is a well-placed doubt, but I think he is still wrong about the most useful comparison.
^18	  Gadamer,1979: 267-74.
^19	  Despite this, Nussbaum endorses the standard view.
^20	  If my interpretation is correct, there is a much more fruitful and illuminating comparison to be drawn between discourse ethics and Kant’s ethical theory, between principle (U) and the categorical imperative .Kant’s Moral Theory				Habermas’s Discourse Ethics		 Ordinary Understanding of Morality 	Actually Existing Moral Practice	Maxims					Candidate Moral NormsCategorical Imperative (FUL)			Principle (U) 		 Moral Laws 					Valid Moral Norms	 Action tokens/action types			Actions, judgements etc.
^21	  These two ideas are more prominent in Rawls’s later work than the idea of the original position. Rawls devotes a chapter each to the Idea of an Overlapping Consensus and the Idea of Public Reason, whereas discussion of the original position is confined to a short subsection each of the introduction and of chapter VIII. (Rawls, 2005:  22-8, 304-10). 
^22	  In their introduction to the English translation of Habermas’s The Inclusion of the Other De Greiff and Cronin give a brief but reliable account of the Habermas-Rawls dispute, albeit from Habermas’s perspective. Because their account is so brief, however, they do not distinguish between the methodological and the substantive differences, and do not give any detail about what the substantive disputes are. However, they are dead right that the salient points of comparison between the two are “their respective analyses of the legitimating function of the public use of reason” and that the dispute is about where, ultimately, the constraints on legitimacy are located. (Habermas, 1999: xix) 
^23	  I agree with David Peritz that “there are real and important divergences in their basic ideas and approaches”. However, I think we must separate the issues from the differences. (Peritz, 2003: 3) http://pages.slc.edu/~dperitz/papers/substantive%20and%20procedural.pdf
^24	  The term legitimacy does not occur in the index to A Theory of Justice. (Rawls 1973: 598) However Rawls does discuss the liberal principle of legitimacy in Political Liberalism. (Rawls 2005: 110, 216,224-8,  393, 427-433)
^25	  See Simmons, 1999.
^26	  Rousseau begins Du Contrat Social with the following lines: “Je veux chercher si dans l’order civil il peut y avoir quelque regle d’administration légitime et sûre... ” (Rousseau : 1964 [1762: 352) The term is current right through the various traditions of early modern political theory and goes back at least as far as the scholastics. This suffices to refute David Beetham’s claim that the term ‘legitimacy’ (though not the concept) “entered political discourse via controversies over the righful succession to the restored French throne after the Napoleonic period.”  (Beetham, 1998: http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/S034). Interestingly, while Rawls and following him Freeman see Kant and Rousseau as forerunners of the liberal concept of legitimacy, Habermas understands them as representatives of the republican tradition. (Freeman, 2003: 39) Habermas is close to Simmons in seeing Locke as the forerunner of the liberal tradition (Simmons, 1999).
^27	  This is a criterion of legitimacy in the weaker sense of a reliable indicator. The Universal Principle of Right is a criterion of legitimacy in the much stronger sense of a necessary and sufficient condition.
^28	  Weber uses the term ‘legitimacy’ in a specific subjective sense, which turns on whether members of a political community have the appropriate and values, beliefs, and attitudes towards the state, its laws and its monopoly on violence. (Weber, 1947: 1, 30-36; & 2002: 312) Charles Taylor calls this Weberian notion the ‘attitudinal’ sense of legitimacy and distinguishes it from legitimacy understood “as a term of objective evaluation of regimes” which would denote the properties or features of a political order that the beliefs or attitudes and values of its members would ‘track’. (Taylor, 1994: 58)
^29	  Habermas seems to means here that subjects can understand themselves as authors of a law, if they could have decided (as a result of an ideally prosecuted discourse) to impose that law upon themselves.
^30	  For example: “Dans une cité bien conduite, chacun vole aux assemblées.” (Rousseau, 1964 : 428)
^31	  Both (D) and the principle of democracy differ from the moral principle (U) which has the logical form of a biconditional and gives the necessary and sufficient conditions of the validity of moral norms. See Finlayson, 2000.
^32	  Principle (U) gives the necessary and sufficient conditions of the validity of a moral norm, and is the criterion of moral rightness. Principle (D) specifies a necessary condition of action norms in general – political and moral norms.  Habermas writes; “I understand an action norm as temporally ,socially and substantively generalized behavioural expectations” (Habermas, 1996: 107).
^33	  Incidentally Rawls holds a similar view. In a liberal society governments are concerned not just with securing stability, but a particular kind of stability, “secured by sufficient motivation of the appropriate kind acquired under just institutions”. (Rawls, 2005: 143)
^34	  Habermas argues that “matters in need of legal regulation certainly do not raise moral questions only, but also involve empirical, pragmatic and ethical aspects as well as issues concerned with the fair balancing of interests open to compromise…Unlike the clearly focused normative validity claim of moral commands, the legitimacy claim of legal norms, like the legislative practice of justification itself, is supported by different types of reasons.”(Habermas, 1996: 452; 1999: 255-7)
^35	  Habermas, 1992b: 64-66; 1993: 13; 1996, 103, 108 & 113; 1999, 42-3.
^36	  I’m taking moral principles here to refer to norms, rather than to the moral principle (U) which is a higher-order principle supposedly derived from the rules of discourse. That is, I’m reading ‘moralischen Grundsätzen” (Habermas, 1992b;  137:1996, 106) as equivalent with “Moralnormen”  (Habermas, 1992b: 193;  1996, 155) where he makes the same claim i.e., that “legal norms…claim to be in accord with moral norms, that is, not to violate them.”
^37	  Habermas, 1996: 111, 452, 453, & 457.
^38	  See also Rawls, 2005: 144-5).  
^39	  Rawls distinguishes the public political forum from the “background culture” or “culture of civil society”. The former comprises a) the discourse of judges and especially the supreme court; b) the discourse of government officials; and c) the discourse of candidates for public office. (Rawls, 2005: 443)
^40	  “Habermas’s position… is a comprehensive doctrine that covers many things far beyond political philosophy. Indeed, the aim of his theory of communicative action is to find a general account of meaning, reference and truth or validity both for theoretical reason and for the several forms of practical reason.” Rawls, 2005: 376.
^41	  Rawls, 2005: 377-8; Habermas, 1996: xli. See also Rawls, 2005: 225ff.
^42	  “[T]hey [i.e. world-views GF] cannot merely be understood as an ordered set of statements of fact; their content cannot be expressed completely in sentences that admit of truth and they do not form a symbolic system that can be true of false as such.” (Habermas, 1995: 126)
^43	  Lessing, 1972 [1779]. 
^44	  Habermas brackets theoretical and moral discourses together because, although he thinks that moral statements don’t literally make claims to truth, he thinks that claims to rightness are analogous to claims to truth. This view is controversial. (See Finlayson, 2005) Habermas maintains that religions and world views differ in two respects from discourses that aim at truth or rightness: First, the latter are amenable to support by a body of reasons, evidence and justification, which aim at truth or rightness or some overarching norm of correctness. Second, something like the principle of fallibilism applies to the latter, but not the former, since reasons, evidence and arguments might turn up that demonstrably show them to have been wrong.
^45	  My understanding of the importance of the differences in method and approach between Rawls and Habermas is indebted to an unpublished manuscript by David Peritz.  Peritz, 2003: 24-29.
^46	  The difference here may be exaggerated by the fact that Habermas has a very wide conception of the democratic procedure (and the constitution), which includes the role of weak public sphere (or as Rawls would put it the  “background culture”, whereas Rawls has a comparatively narrow conception of the political process and the constitution. Furthermore, as we saw in 2. above Habermas and Rawls have very different notions of justice.  
